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COMPUTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS: THE FCC
DILEMMA IN DETERMINING WHAT TO REGULATE
Hanan Samet*
Pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934, the FCC has been
charged with regulatory authority over communications carriage services.
Recent technological developments have induced communication carriers to
employ computers to perform functions other than communications car-
riage. Professor Samet examines the potential merger of the services pro-
vided by the regulated communications industry and the previously unreg-
ulated data processing industry with a focus upon the FCC's regulatory
role after the merger.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)' is now in the midst of
evaluating the comments of a self-initiated inquiry2 concerning its role in
the future regulation, or non-regulation, of' aspects of' the communications
industry pertaining to the use of computers. This inquiry emerged from the
FCC's recognition that communications services and computer services are
converging.
Traditionally, the FCC has regulated the communications carriage serv-
ices, an industry which often exhibits natural monopoly characteristics. 3 The
* Assistant Professor of Computer Science, University of Maryland at College Park. B.S.,
UCLA, 1970; Ph.D., Stanford University, 1975.
1. The FCC was created by Congress in 1934 with a mandate to regulate the communica-
tions industry. Communications Act of 1934, § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). However, the portion
of the Communications Act dealing with point-to-point communication consisted primarily of
language borrowed from similar provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. Regulation of tele-
phone and telegram service started with the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-218, § 7,
36 Stat. 539, 546 amending Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-104, 24 Stat. 379
which was promulgated to control 19th century rail and barge traffic. See Berman, Computer or
Communications? Allocation of Functions and the Role of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 27 FED. COM. B.J. 161, 165 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Berman]. Many of the considera-
tions which were taken into account at that time are no longer meaningful and, in fact, Con-
gress is now in the process of rewriting the entire Communications Act. Also under considera-
tion is the Consumer Communications Relorm Act of 1976, aimed at reforming the common
carrier portions of the Act from a certain vantage point. See also STAFF OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON COMMUNICATIONS: COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, 95TH. CONG., 1ST SESS., OPTIONS PAPERS (Subcomm. Print 1977).
AT&T has expressed strong support for this bill. In particular, if passed, it would reverse many
of the FCC's pro-competition actions.
2. Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rule Making, Amendment of Section 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations, 61 F.C.C.2d 103 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Notice of In-
quiry II] ; Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Enlargement of Proposed Rulemaking, Amend-
ment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Computer Inquiry), 64
F.C.C.2d 771 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Supplemental Notice].
3. For one definition of communications common carriers see note 159 and accompanying
text infra. Regulation is a process which accompanies the government's acquiescence to a
natural monopoly and serves to prevent abuse of a firm's monopoly position. In a natural
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Communications Act of 1934 was passed in recognition of this fact as well as
to ensure the availability of' efficient service at reasonable charges to the
entire country. 4  It was felt that only through such regulation could every
citizen be protected against potential abuses of such monopolies. However,
such regulation also has the effect of shielding the carriers from competition
in activities which are incidental to carriage5 and are not in themselves
natural monopolies. Increasingly, carriers are finding it beneficial to use
computers to perform these "incidental" finctions and it is in this region
that the different market philosophies of the computer and communications
sectors are on a collision course. 6
Computers and data processing services7 have traditionally been unregu-
lated. This industry has thrived on competition and has been spurred by it.
Currently, however, its members are finding themselves competing to some
degree with the communications common carriers. In particular, the compu-
monopoly, the most economical service can be realized by a single commercial entity because
duplication of services is most likely to result in higher costs with no visible benefits to the
user. One example is the electric power industry. A more relevant example is private home
telephone service. In this case, the usefulness of the service would be destroyed if one would
have a choice of telephone services since this would imply that in order to be able to communi-
cate with all users one would have to subscribe to all services. Note that the home telephone
monopoly is different from business telephone service where it is perfectly reasonable to expect
that a customer might wish direct service to a finite number of points. This is the basis of MCI's
Execunet service. See note 144 and accompanying text infra.
Regulation has also been applied to competitive industries; however, unlike natural
monopolies, the results have been generally disappointing ( e.g., regulation of the railroads and
the trucking industry which are competitors in the freight business). The problems are numer-
ous. Setting a price level is virtually impossible due to the various underlying financial struc-
tures of the competitors. Whenever a price level is set, the invariable results are different levels
of service and possibly ruinous competition as weaker components join the fray.
Another serious problem is that of differential pricing. The reduction of price in a certain
segment of the market by one firm may seriously jeopardize the financial health of those of its
competitors who depend upon the affected market segment for the bulk of their revenues. This
situation can not be ignored by the regulatory agency since such action may result in the elimi-
nation of service to a certain class of customers, and thus the regulator is compelled to take
protectionist measures. For a more thorough discussion of regulation see generally the com-
ments of Mr. Jones on the regulation of competitive activities in Reply Comments of IBM. The
FCC solicited the comments of the various parties likely to be affected by regulation of data
processing. [Hereinafter they will be cited as Reply Comments.] Jones, An Example of a Reg-
ulatory Alternative to Antitrust: New York Utilities in the Early Seventies, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
462 (1973); Jones, Judicial Determination oJ Public Utility Rates: A Critique, 54 B.U.L. REy.
873 (1974).
4. See note I supra.
5. Examples include modulation, demodulation, error correction, finding a minimum path
through a network, etc. Comunications Act oj" 1934, § 3(a) & (b), 47 U.S.C. § 153(a) & (b). See
also Berman, supra note 1, at 165.
6. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order, American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany (AT&T) Revised to Tariffs F.C.C. Nos. 260 and 267 Relating to Dataspeed 40, 62 F.C.C.
2d 21 (1977), appeals pending, Nos. 77-4005, 77-4020, 77-4059 (2d Cir.) [hereinafter cited as
Dataspeed 40/4]. See also note 17 infra.
7. The terms computers and data processing are used interchangeably in the following text.
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ter industry would like to have a share of the communications market which
is incidental to carriage, thus the collision of the two sectors. The problems
of determining how to allocate the market in services, which are incidental
to carriage, arise, in part, from the 1934 Communications Act which appears
to subject such communications activities to regulation. 8 The regulated car-
riers claim that such services are clearly within their domain, while the data
processing industry claims that these services should be unregulated and
unavailable to the regulated carriers.
Generally, problems in the allocation of the market are inherent in any
situation in which there is competition between regulated and unregulated
entities. The primary issue which arises is whether the competition is to take
place in a regulated or unregulated marketplace. Competition in an unregu-
lated environment invariably leads to charges that the regulated enterprise is
engaging in predatory pricing activities when it seeks to undersell the
unregulated enterprise. 9 On the other hand, the regulated enterprise
charges that the unregulated enterprise is engaging in "cream skimming." 10
A common response to such charges is the regulation of the new competitors
by limiting their pricing policies. 1 The consequence of such regulation is
that the agency exceeds its mandate by regulating both the regulated and
previously unregulated sectors. 12  In effect, the regulatory agency allocates
business between the two sections, in order to protect both enterprises.
Aside from the allocation issue, the FCC is faced with the need to formu-
late a demarcation line between the unregulated computer industry and the
regulated communications industry. 13  Such an attempt by a regulatory
agency leads to a proliferation of artificial distinctions concerning the ac-
tivities to be regulated which may impair economic efficiency and technolog-
ical progress. A further consequence of distinguishing between the regulated
8. See note 5 supra.
9. Predatory pricing means that the regulated enterprise is using its monopoly revenues to
subsidize its non-monopoly activities.
10. See First Report and Order, Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration
of Application to Provide Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public Point-
to-Point Microwave Radio Service and Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43 and 61 of the
Commission's Rules, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 910 (1971). "'Cream skimming" means that only the most
attractive segment of the regulated enterprise's market is being engaged in by the unregulated
enterprise. In particular, the unregulated enterprise will seek the low cost customers whereas
the regulated enterprise may remain with only high cost customers whom it will have to serve
by virtue of its mandate, at a price which will not meet the cost of serving them alone. For
example, in the case of long distance telephone service, the regulated enterprise's charges are
reinforced by pointing to provisions such as section 1 of the 1934 Communications Act which
call for efficient nationwide services with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.
11. See note 3 supra for the discussion of regulation in competitive industries.
12. See, e.g., GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973) (FCC had no author-
ity to regulate a common carrier's business practice in the data processing market).
13. The "maximum separation" requirement in Computer Inquiry 1 where common carriers
wishing to engage in data processing activities could do so only under separate entities. See
e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.702(b) & (c) (1977). See also note 43 infra.
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and unregulated sectors is the possibility that the regulated entity may be
unnecessarily excluded from a sector under the guise of prohibiting preda-
tory behavior. 14
The first Inquiry 15 was conducted to investigate the problems emerging
because of the overlap in the computer communications industry. In it, the
FCC considered the ramifications of' regulation upon data processing, and
the restrictions it would impose on carrier entry in the data processing mar-
ket. As a result, the Commission declined to regulate the data processing
market, permitting carriers to enter the data processing market through
separate independent subsidiaries. 16
Subsequent to Inquiry I, technological developments 17 resulted in a need
to re-examine some of the policies promulgated in that Inquiry. Such de-
velopments led to Inquiry 11. While Inquiry II was in progress, AT&T de-
veloped a new offering, Dataspeed 40/4,18 which could not be easily
characterized under the existing rules or the proposed rules. Because the
FCC had to rule on this peripheral device, it enlarged Computer Inquiry II
by issuing the Supplemental Notice of Inquiry. In particular, the respon-
dents were to address problems posed by communications common carriers'
(e.g. AT&T) provision of services which include peripheral devices (e.g.
Dataspeed 40/4).
The purpose of this Article will be to chronicle the developments in FCC
regulation which emerged or are likely to emerge out of their two Inquiries,
14. See, e.g., United States v. Western Elec. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 68,246,
71,134 (D.N.J. 1956). The judgment of this case is often referred to as the 1956 Consent De-
cree.
15. Notice of Inquiry, Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of
Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Notice of Inquiry 1]. Out of it emerged a decision in which the Commission attempted to
formulate the proper roles for itself and the communications common carriers in the converging
sectors of communications and computer services. Tentative Decision, Regulatory and Policy
Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and
Facilities Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Tentative Decision]; Final De-
cision and Order, Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter and Communication Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971), rehearing denied, 34
F.C.C.2d 557 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Final Decision] .
16. However, this had the effect of precluding AT&T from entering the data processing
market due to a Consent Decree they entered into in 1956 in the case of United States v.
Western Elec. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 68,246 & 71,138 (1956) which prohibited them
from engaging in non-regulated activities. Id. at 71,137-38.
17. See note 57 infra. E.g., the newest digital switching systems of the phone companies are
sophisticated computers capable of performing a variety of data processing tasks as well as
switching phone lines. Also, there is no longer a discernible distinction between a terminal used
for communications and one used as an input/output device for a computer. In economic terms,
the American telephone industry billed its customers $25 billion for telecommunications serv-
ices in 1977 while the domestic data processing industry, including its foreign operations, had
sales totaling $38 billion. Moreover AT&T estimates that the American "information services"
industry will have $380 billion in annual sales by the early 1990's. The New Telephone Industry,
Bus. WEEK, February 13, 1978, 68-70.
18. See note 6 supra.
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while describing technological advancements, such as Dataspeed 40/4, which
were the impetus for the Inquiries. Finally, the Article will evaluate the
usefulness of the standards and proposed regulations. Since it is important to
consider the Inquiries with respect to the parties affected by them, some
attention will be directed to the positions asserted by AT&T, IBM and the
Department of' Justice. Close scrutiny of these individual parties' responses
reveals that much more than the public interest is at stake when a particular
economic sector is to be regulated. The economic survival of a number of
entities is also a concomitant of regulation.
COMPUTER INQUIRY I
The first computer inquiry was prompted, in part, by a dispute between
the Bunker Ramo Corporation and Western Union. l9 The conflict occurred
when Western Union, pursuant to its tariff, refused to sell communications
circuits to Bunker Ramo, contending that Bunker Ramo had engaged in the
resale of communications services, a process forbidden to non-common car-
riers. 20 Confronted with this controversy, the FCC characterized its In-
quiry as involving two questions. 21 The first was one of' a policy nature:
whether or not data processing was to be regulated. The second was con-
cerned with the communications common carrier's role in poviding data pro-
cessing services. The second question was further complicated by the exis-
tence of services in which data processing and communications were so
closely intertwined that a simple distinction would be difficult to make.
19. Bunker Ramo had a stock price quotation system, Telequote 111, which offered users up
to date information on any stock traded on the exchange. This service used private line wires of
Western Union. Subsequently, Bunker Ramo introduced a new service, Telequote IV, which
enabled users to communicate with each other through the use of the Bunker Ramo computer
as a store forward device. An order would be sent to the computer and stored there until polled
by another computer which would forward it to the appropriate broker or trader. Although it
had willingly provided carriage services for the Telequote I11 offering, Western Union balked at
doing the same for the Telequote IV offering. In the Telequote III offering users had no choice
as to what type of information was being communicated. Only recorded stock price quotations
were transmitted. This was not the case, however, in the Telequote IV offering.
Western Union's action was undoubtedly based on its fear that given this communication
capability, there was nothing to prevent users, as well as Bunker Ramo, from using their
facilities for all types of communications. Bunker Ramo subsequently withdrew the Telequote
IV offering and thus the FCC never did have the opportunity to rule on the issue. See Com-
ment, Federal Communications Commission Regulation of Domestic Computer Communications:
A Competitive Reformation, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 947, 961 (1973); Note, The FCC Computer
Inquiry: Interfaces of Competitive and Regulated Markets, 71 MICH. L. REx. 172, 192 (1972);
Note, Computer Services and the Federal Regulation of Communications, 116 U. PA. L. REv'.
328, 329 (1967).
20. 1934 Communications Act, § 203(c)(3), 47 U.S.C. § 203(c)(3) (1970).
21. The questions were: (a) The nature and extent of the regulatory jurisdiction to be
applied to data processing services; and (b) Whether, under what circumstances, and subject to
what conditions or safeguards, common carriers should be permitted to engage in data proces-
sing. Tentative Decision, supra note 15, at 295.
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The Nonregulation of Data Processing
In dealing with the question of whether to regulate data processing, the
FCC observed that since computers were not in existence at the time the
Communications Act of 1934 was enacted, it could not turn to the Act for
assistance in determining whether it had any authority for the regulation of
data processing. Instead, it turned to United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co. 22 which affirmed a grant of expansive powers to the FCC.2 3 Therefbre,
the Commission concluded that it had authority to regulate "communications
facilities and services not in existence, or even anticipated, at the time the
Communications Act of 1934 was enacted." 2 4
Prior to any attempt to draw a line between communications and data
processing, the FCC pointed to the record before it as demonstrating that
pure data processing services were essentially a competitive business and,
therefore, in no need of regulation. Consequently, the Commission con-
cluded that it saw "no need to assert regulatory authority over data proces-
sing services whether or not such services employ communications facilities
in order to link the terminals of' the subscribers to centralized computers." 25
Nevertheless, it did reserve the option to re-examine its polcies should there
"develop significant changes in the structure of' the data processing industry,
or, if abuses emerge which require the exercise of' corrective action by the
Commission ."26
Maximum Separation
Having determined that data processing should remain unregulated, the
FCC turned to the problem posed by the provision of' data processing serv-
ices by common carriers. To justify such offerings, the communications
common carriers urged that it would promote a more efficient use of the
excess capacity of their in-house computers and create additional competition
in the marketplace. 27  The disadvantages, however, were found to be
22. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
23. Tentative Decision, supra note 15, at 296, citing United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co., 392 U.S. 157,173 (1968).
24. Id. at 297. The FCC noted that it was not required to assert jurisdiction over a particu-
lar activity because it might be construed as being within the scope of the Communications Act
of 1934. Id. Instead, it saw itself as being "entitled to some leeway in choosing which jurisdic-
tional base and which regulatory tools will be most effective in advancing the Congressional
objective." Id., quoting Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co., v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282, 284
(D.C. Cir. 1966). But see National Ass'n. of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs. v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
25. Tentative Decision, supra note 15, at 298. This decision coupled with the 1956 Con-
sent Decree which precludes AT&T from offering non-regulated services has the effect of
excluding AT&T from the data processing marketplace.
26. Id.
27. Note, The FCC Computer Inquiry: Interfaces of Competitive and Regulated Markets,
71 MicH. L. REv. 172, 188-89 (1972).
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numerous. 28 Foreseeable problems included: the ever-present danger of
cross subsidization and predatory pricing; the potential for discrimination by
the carrier in providing services to its non-carrier competitors; 29 and the
possibility that the carrier's control over the customer's communication facil-
ity could enable it to exert subtle pressures on the customer to procure data
processing services from it as well.
The FCC compromised by allowing common carriers to provide data pro-
cessing services through separate corporate entities.3 0  This policy of
"maximum separation" prohibited the carriers from selling or promoting
data processing activities on behalf of its data processing affiliate. 3 ' Further,
the FCC's decision stipulated that the carrier involved in data processing
should employ only equipment and services which are adapted for data pro-
cessing and other non-common carrier services exclusively.3 2  This mandate
eliminates any potential overlap in communications carriage and data proces-
sing.
Despite objections by Western Union,33 the FCC ruled against allowing a
carrier to sell its excess oft-peak or "back-up" computing system capacity.
3 4
It felt that the "carrier's 'back-up' system should be designed to meet
foreseeable breakdowns of equipment dedicated to public service and it
should be available instantly for that purpose without the conflicting claims
of other users." 3 5
28. Id. at 189-94.
29. Some examples included a slow response to orders for new services and outages, the
assignment of inferior grade lines and switching facilities, and, most importantly, abuse by the
carrier of its right to refuse to provide services on the grounds of alleged tariff violations. Final
Decision, supra note 15, at 274.
30. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702 (b) & (c) (1977).
31. Id. at (c) (3).
32. Tentative Decision, supra note 15, at 303. In establishing this policy, the Commission
took into account powers granted to it by Sections 201(a) and 214(d) of the Communications Act
and concluded that it had "ample jurisdiction to bar carriers from providing data processing
services upon a proper finding that it would prevent them from discharging their common
carrier responsibilities in a manner consistent with the standards and objectives of the Com-
munications Act." id. at 30-01. As long as the 1956 Consent Decree is in force, this policy is
only applicable to common carriers other than AT&T (e.g., GTE, Western Union, etc.) since
AT&T can only provide regulated services.
33. Final Decision, supra note 15, at 271.
34. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(d) (1977).
35. Final Decision, supra note 15, at 271. This conclusion was based, in part, on a belief
that normal peaks do occur from time to time. The Commission also dismissed the carrier's
claim that their participation in data processing would be beneficial due to increased competi-
tion when it reiterated its belief that the industry was one characterized by a large number of
competitors with low entry barriers. Id. at 270, citing Tentative Decision, supra note 15, at
297. In its Final Decision, the FCC, at the urging of several of the parties, expanded the
prohibitions on carrier activities set forth in the Tentative Decision. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(c) (4) &
(5) (1972). First, a carrier's data processing affiliate was prohibited from using the name of its
parent common carrier in its promotions, and also from using in its corporate name any words
or symbols appearing in the name of its parent common carrier. Second, a common carrier was
prohibited from obtaining any data processing services from its separate corporate affiliate. This
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The policy of maximum separation did not go unchallenged for long. Soon
after the FCC announced its decision, several communications common car-
riers 36 filed petitions for a review of the conditions tinder which they may
compete in the data processing sector. The carriers were objecting to the
restrictions placed on their dealings with their separate affiliates. 3 7 These
objections culminated in the GTE Service Corp. v. FCC3s decision, in
which the Second Circuit reviewed the maximum separation policy.
The court in GTE Service Corp. first addressed the issue of "whether the
Federal Communications Commission is authorized by Congress to promul-
gate rules regulating the entrance of communications common carriers into
the nonregulated field of data processing services." 3 9  The court relied on
the 1934 Communications Act 4 0 as providing such authority.
Once the authority of the FCC to promulgate rules was determined, the
court stated that, despite the absence of any reference to computers in the
statute, there was strong precedent for an expansive definition of communi-
cations. In particular, it observed that Congress recognized that communica-
tions is a dynamic field and framed an Act with expansive powers so that the
Commission would respond as the industry evolved. 41
was based, in part, on arguments that exclusive transactions between a carrier and its data
processing affiliate would have a substantial impact on the competitive market where small firms
would be unable to obtain a contract with so large a customer. Fear was also expressed that
"excessive payments by carriers to data processing affiliates would enable the affiliates to un-
fairly underprice their own competitors in the data processing market." Id. at 273. Neverthe-
less, despite the experience of Bunker Ramo with Western Union, see note 19 supra, the
Commission declined to address the problem of the carrier favoring its data processing affiliate
while supplying communications facilities and services to a competitor. This was predicated on
its lack of conviction "that the public interest requires total preclusion of carriers from offering
data processing services." Final Decision, supra note 15, at 274. However, it did state that "any
such favoritism is contrary to the obligations of the carriers under the requirements of the Act."
id.
36. These included GTE Service Corporation, United Telephone Company of Missouri,
Western Union Telegraph Company, International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, and
Continental Telephone Corporation.
37. The carriers took exception to provisions of the rules which preclude them from obtain-
ing any data processing services from their data processing affiliates, and also prohibit their
separate affiliates from employing in their name any words or symbols contained in the name of
the parent.
38. 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973).
39. id. at 730.
40. The Act states that the FCC was created: " [ f ] or the purpose of regulating interstate
and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as
possible, to all people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire
and radio communications service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges. ... 47
U.S.C. § 151 (1970); see note 1 supra. Authority for rulemaking was found in Section 4(i) of the
Act wherein the Commission was authorized to "make such rules and regulations, and issue
such orders . . . as may be necessary in the execution of its functions." Communications Act of
1934, Section 4(i), 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1970).
41. See GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC 474 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1973) citing NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) (network practices found to be inimical to the public interest).
[Vol. 28:71
COMPUTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS
Next, the court discussed whether "the proper role of the FCC should be
to wait for actual abuses [to occur] and then proceed on an adjudicatory basis
rather than through the device of rule-making." 42  The court held that it
need not do so, basing its decision, in part, on the fact that the Commission
was entering into a new area of policy which affects a large number of en-
tities. In particular, it stated: "[TIhe choice made between proceeding by
general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in
the informed discretion of the administrative agency." 43
With respect to the institution of a prohibition on common carriers procur-
ing data processing services from their affiliates, the court found that the
FCC had exceeded its jurisdictional authority. 44 The court recognized the
Commission's concern that the regulated carries continue to provide the
public with efficient and economic communications services. However, it felt
that the rules were not formulated for the protection of the "communications
market which Congress has entrusted to its care, but fbr data processing
which is beyond its charge and which the Commission itself has announced
it declines to regulate." 45
Thus the court concluded:
[El ven absent explicit reference in the statute, the expansive power of the Com-
mission in the electronic communications field includes the jurisdictional authority
to regulate carrier activities in an area as intimately related to the communications
industry as that of computer services, where such activities may substantially affect
the efficient provision of reasonably priced communications service.
Id.
42. id.
43. Id., quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). These holdings essen-
tially validated 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.702(b);(c) (1),(2),(3); & (d) (1977). 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(b) pro-
vided that, except for non-Bell system companies, communications common carriers could not
furnish data processing unless they complied with the maximum separation requirements of 47
C.F.R. § 64.702(c)(1). Recall that Bell system companies were already excluded by virtue of the
1956 Consent Decree. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(c) (1) required that each such separate corporation
had to maintain its own books of account as well as to utilize separate operating personnel and
computing equipment from those of the parent carrier. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702 (c) (2) stipulated that
copies of all agreements entered into between the separate data processing corporation and the
parent common carrier be deposited with the FCC. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(c) (3) prohibited the
parent common carrier from selling or promoting the sale of data processing services on behalf
of its separate corporation. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(d) forbade a common carrier from selling or
leasing any of its computing capacity which it ordinarily used for the provision of its communica-
tions common carrier services.
44. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 733 (2d Cir. 1973), 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(c) (4) &
(5) had the effect of precluding the common carriers from procuring any data processing services
from their separate affiliates. Moreover, they prohibited the separate affiliate from employing in
its name any words or symbols contained in the name of the parent carrier or from using the
carrier's name in the affiliate's promotional enterprises.
45. 474 F.2d at 733. The Commission had argued that it had a right to make regulations on
the basis of antitrust considerations to which the court responded that "the unfair competition,
restraint of trade or potential threat of monopoly, must be in a market in which the Commission
has jurisdiction." Id. at 734. In this case, the threat was to the data processing industry-an
area where the enforcement of the Sherman and Clayton antitrust acts is within the purview of
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GTE Service Corp. should be read as an endorsement of the "maximum
separation" doctrine.4 6  However, the policy extends only to the protection
of customers in the communications sector. Once the separate affiliates have
been created, any regulation pertaining to their practices in sectors other
than communications is not within the Commission's purview. Pursuant to a
1956 Consent Decree in the case of United States v. Western Electric,47
AT&T is barred from the data processing market. As long as AT&T remains
barred, the GTE Service Corp. decision is not of major importance. How-
ever, should the bar contained in the 1956 Consent Decree be lifted, then
GTE Service Corp. takes on an extremely important dimension since it un-
leashes an economic giant in a market in which the FCC has little or no
control.
Hybrid Services
In addition to the maximum separation doctrine, Computer Inquiry I dealt
with services in which communications and data processing services were
intertwined-the so-called "hybrid services." 48  In evaluating whether a
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission.
In reaching its decision, the court elaborated on its interpretation of the "maximum separa-
tion" doctrine. In its eyes, this device was developed as a means of enabling a carrier to provide
data processing services to others while at the same time insuring that communications custom-
ers are in no way penalized for the carrier's activity in the unregulated data processing sector.
Specifically, the FCC was concerned with the possibility that costs incurred in the data proces-
sing sector would be passed on to communications customers, or alternatively, that revenues
from common carrier services would be used to subsidize data processing services. Therefore,
the court concluded, the separate corporate entity was not a device devised by the carrier to
avoid regulation. Yet, it added, the FCC, after forcing the creation pursuant to 47 C.F.R. §
64 .702(c), was now attempting to invoke §§ 64.702(c) (4) & (5) (1972) on the grounds that it (the
separate corporate afliliate) was a means of avoiding regulation. This, determined the court, was
improper when it stated that the concerns of the FCC, that the above improprieties may cause
"irreparable harm" to the data processing industry, may "support the 'maximum separation'
concept of the approved rules, but do not sustain the Commission's intrusion into the data
processing activities of the separate affiliate." Id. at 735.
46. Any objection to the maximum separation policy from the point of view of a data proces-
sing user or a data processing service organization is not appropriate. Recall that charges of
unfair practices are within the jurisdiction of other agencies such as the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department or the Federal Trade Commission.
47. TRADE REG, REP. (CCH) 68,246 & 71,138 (1956).
48. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) provides the following definitions:
(1) Data Processing-The use of a computer for the processing of information as
distinguished from circuit or message-switching. "Processing" involves the use of
the computer for operations which include, inter alia, the functions of storing,
retrieving, sorting, merging and calculating data, according to programmed in-
structions.
(2) Message-Switching-The computer-controlled transmission of messages, be-
tween two or more points, via communications facilities, wherein the content of
the message remains unaltered.
(3) Local Data Processing Service-An offering of data processing wherein com-
munications facilities are not involved in serving the customer.
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hybrid service 49 was to be regulated, the FCC decided it would determine
the primary functions performed by the service. 50 If it was primarily a data
processing service, then the entity which offered the service would not be
subject to common carrier regulation. 51  If' however, the offering was de-
signed primarily to meet the communications needs of the subscriber then
it would be regulated subject to the Communications Act whether or not the
offeror was a common carrier.52
Under the "primary function" approach to regulation, when a common
carrier intended to offer a hybrid communications service, it was required to
file its tariff with the FCC. 53  No such requirement, of' course, was placed
on non-common carriers who were planning to offer a hybrid data processing
(4) Remote Access Data Processing Service-An offering of data processing wherein
communications facilities, linking a central computer to remote customer termi-
nals, provide a vehicle for the transmission of data between such computer and
customer terminals.
(5) Hybrid Service-An offering of service which combines Remote Access data
processing and message switching to form a single integrated service.
Tentative Decision, supra note 15, at 295-96. The definitions distinguish the use of a compu-
ter for message-switching from its use in data processing by stating that in the former the
content of the message remained unaltered. Thus in the case of message-switching, the compu-
ter was viewed as replacing the manual or electromechanical switching operations which had
traditionally been provided by the communications common carriers.
49. The FCC declined to give specific factual situations where a hybrid service would be
ruled hybrid data processing and where it would be ruled hybrid communications. Instead, it
felt that guidelines could be best established by a process of review and evaluation, on an ad
hoc basis, of factual situations as they arose. It was willing to proceed on a case by case basis
because it felt it lacked experience in this domain, and also it did not want to retard the
development of new services. Final Decision, supra note 15, at 278-79.
50. This concept is a crucial aspect of the inquiry because the effectiveness of decisions with
respect to maximum separation and lack of regulation of data processing can be seriously un-
dermined depending upon how widely the FCC defines hybrid communications services.
51. Even if the service involved message-switching, when offered as an incidental feature of
the data processing service, it would not be subject to common carrier regulation. Tentative
Decision, supra note 15, at 305. A common carrier wishing to offer a data processing service
with some message-switching must still do so under maximum separation.
52. Id. A non-common carrier wishing to offer such a service would be required to become
a common carrier. In determining the characteristics of the service, the Commission stated that
it would examine the context in which the service was being offered. Id. One test would be
whether the service had the attributes of point-to-point services offered by the conventional
communications common carriers and thus was basically a substitute for them. Another test
would be whether the message-switching capability was essentially independent of the data
processing component. These tests were to be carefully applied by the FCC in recognition of
the 1956 Consent Decree which precludes AT&T from offering non-tariffed services. Id. Such
considerations probably resulted in the FCC bending backwards in order to aid AT&T in the
Dataspeed matter just as it is often accused of doing in the case of Western Union.
53. Final Decision, supra note 15, at 279. The tariff is the means of regulation which pro-




service since these services were to be unregulated. 54  This left it to the
common carriers to police the line between communications and data pro-
cessing. If a carrier decided that the service to be offered by a data process-
ing entity was a hybrid communications service rather than a hybrid data
processing service, it could call the violation to the attention of the FCC or
refuse to sell communications services to the data processor. The grounds for
refusal to sell were that the carrier's tariff' prohibited it from selling carriage
to one who intended to resell it.55
These self-policing provisions assumed that the policing carrier would be
scrupulous in evaluating the offering and deciding whether it was data pro-
cessing or communications. This led to a number of problems. 56  First, the
risk of establishing a hybrid data processing service was increased because of
the danger of drawing the attention of the FCC or the policing carrier. The
potential offeror would not know if the offering would be regulated. Second,
there was a burden imposed on the ofleror in preparing for hearings before
the FCC should the nature of' the service be called into question. Third,
since the primary thrust of a business was often undergoing change, the
offeror would constantly be subject to re-examination by the policing carrier
or the FCC. Ultimately, the carriers may be promoting their self-interest by
questioning the emergence of these new services since data processing af-
filiates are likely to provide the carriers with some competition.
COMPUTER INQUIRY II
Increasingly, as computing finctions are being decentralized, there is a
growing merger of data processing and communications activities in "intelli-
gent" terminals. 57  Such terminals are furnished to the user by both the
regulated common carriers and members of the unregulated terminal
equipment manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, the terminals are under the
control of the user rather than the carrier or manufacturer. These advances
raise the question of' whether the "intelligence" is data processing or com-
munications. The definitions promulgated in Computer Inquiry I are in-
54. Communications common carriers could only offer hybrid data processing services under
maximum separation. Non-common carriers desiring to offer hybrid communications services
would have to become common carriers.
55. Final Decision, supra note 15, at 279-80. See Report and Order, Regulatory Policies
Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Services, 60 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976); aff'd
sub. nom. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC (2d Cir. 1978) (allows resale but specifies that
resellers must become common carriers).
56. Berman, supra note 1, at 181-82.
57. This is attractive to users because they do not have to use communication facilities as
heavily as before thereby lowering their costs. Another important new development has been
the miniaturization of logic and memory. This has resulted in decreasing costs and has led to
the development of microprocessors, which are small computers embedded in devices other
than central processors. An additional, and somewhat parallel, development has been the
growth in the use of networks of computers where some of the computing power ('intelligence")
is distributed into the network rather than the terminal.
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adequate since they were directed at a computing environment in which
data processing was performed by a central processor, and thus are of little
help when new applications are being considered. 58
In order to cope with such issues, the FCC undertook to revise the rules
set forth in Computer Inquiry I. The revised rules proposed in Computer
Inquiry I1 maintain the maximum separation regulatory policies set forth in
Computer Inquiry I. Inquiry II subsequently proposed a definition of data
processing as the "use of a computer for the purposes of processing informa-
tion wherein: (a) the semantic content, or meaning, of input data is in any
way transformed, or (b) where the output data constitute a programmed re-
sponse to input data."5 9  This definition appropriately recognizes that all
computers perform a combination of the basic steps of arithmetic, logic,
storage, retrieval, and transfer. 60  Therefore, the amalgamation of these
steps into programs is not necessarily data processing.
Data processing services61 could not be offered by a communications
common carrier except under the maximum separation conditions. Nonethe-
less, not all services employing the use of computers are necessarily in the
domain of data processing services. 62  They can be distinguished from data
58. Consider such features as call forwarding, restricted and abbreviated dialing, etc.; their
provision may lead to disputes since they can be achieved either by the terminal or by the
network as AT&T is doing in its new ESS equipment. Notice of Inquiry I1, supra note 2, at
106.
59. Id. at 107. A comment explains that the term "program" is used in its broadest sense
and includes software which is user alterable as well as hardwired or ROM (read only memory).
This explanation is important because it demonstrates recognition by the Commission of the
trend toward embedding programs in the actual circuitry of the computer. This trend has been
fueled by the rapidly decreasing cost of memory and switching circuitry.
60. In greater detail one has:
arithmetic computation-the basic operations of count, add, subtract, multiply, and
divide.
logical computation-operations which include: and, or, not, compare, and branch.
storage, retrieval, and transfer-of alpha-numeric or graphical data.
Id. at 108.
61. These services include:
arithmetic processing-general commercial accounting, payroll, inventory control,
banking and point-of-sale processing, financial and econometric modeling, scientific
calculations, etc.
word processing-a rapidly developing application resulting from advances in
memory technology and word processing software. Applications include: interactive
information retrieval systems, management information systems, text editing, trans-
lation, typesetting, etc.
process control-the increased reliability and availability of computers is leading to
an expansion of application where a computer is used to monitor and control some
process which is occurring continuously-such as a nuclear-powered generating sta-
tion, an electric power distribution grid, an automatic machine tool, or a fire detec-
tion and control system.
Id. at 109.
62. These uses include:
network control and routing-applications include: Message and circuit switching,
speed and code conversion, pulse format conversion, error detection and correction,
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processing on the basis of how a computer applies its computing functions to
the data. In particular, the decisions made by the computer in these applica-
tions are based not on the information content of the data; but, instead, they
are based on the structure of the data. 63  Such services could be incorpo-
rated into the carrier's communication oftering without evoking the con-
straints imposed by the maximum separation requirement.
In general, the critical change in the definition proposed by Inquiry II is
that the term "hybrid" disappeared. The question of whether an offering is
data processing becomes an "all or nothing" decision, and in some instances
the stakes in the determination are rather high. In particular, in the case of
AT&T, a finding that a service is data processing has the effect of precluding
AT&T from offering the services by virtue of the 1956 Consent Decree
which prohibits it from offering anything but a regulated service. 64 Such a
problem arose in the matter of the Dataspeed 40/4 tariff. 65
DATASPEED 40/4
The Dataspeed 40/4 is AT&T's competitive alternative to other "intelli-
gent" remote access devices which allow the customer to make use of a
remote computer by having the information transmitted by phone or a simi-
lar device. Dataspeed was designed to interface with a host computer data
processing system at a location other than the customer's premises. Unlike
other communications devices, 66 however, it can only communicate with
another Dataspeed terminal via a host computer and under computer con-
trol. Essentially, it is a device that contains sufficient memory to store a long
message and enable the user to edit it by correcting his mistakes prior to
transmission. 67
analog to digital and digital to analog conversion, signal processing, and time divi-
sion multiplexing.
input/output processing-this category comprises the uses of a computer capability
resident in a carrier network facility for the purpose of making disparate computers
and terminals compatible with each other. Typical functions are the formatting,
editing, and buffering of data to make it compatible with the electrical characteris-
tics of different transmission media.
Id. at 109--10 (footnote omitted).
63. Examples of data strncturing considerations are whether the message is long enough, or
whether any transmission errors occurred.
64. United States v. Western Elec. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 68, 246 & 71, 137,
(1956).
65. This matter arose on November 18, 1975 when AT&T filed the tariff. The memorandum
opinion and order was adopted on December 22, 1976. At this time Computer Inquiry II was in
progress and the Commission applied the rules set forth in Computer Inquiry I in reaching its
decision in this matter. See Dataspeed 40/4, note 6 supra.
66. For example, TWX is such a communications device.
67. Via appropriate commands the user may manipulate a cursor to make changes in previ-
ously typed text which is on or off the screen (up to 72 lines). The advantages of such a mode of
operation are several:
(1) It enables the efficient use of the central processing computer since it need not
constantly listen to the terminal nor perform such operations as screen manipu-
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Other manufacturers provide comparable 6  and often superior devices.
Dataspeed, however, is not merely a terminal, but instead, is a service
which provides a terminal in conjunction with various transmission modes. 69
In offering the Dataspeed 40/4 service, AT&T evidenced its determination
to avoid being frozen out of the data terminal market whenever customers
desired more efficient communications with a computer. It was especially
concerned that, insofar as the Computer Inquiry I rules did not permit it to
provide data processing, 70 it would be reduced to providing only wires. 71
AT&T contended that it was offering a communications service on the
ground that the service was a natural extension of its role in providing tele-
typewriter service. 72 Therefore, AT&T claimed that it was automating func-
tions previously performed by teletypewriters. 73  Moreover, it relied on the
definition of "message-switching" in Computer Inquiry 174 to argue that "the
functions performed by the Dataspeed 40/4 service are clearly communica-
tions since the informational content of the message transmitted is (a) con-
trolled by the customer and (b) not altered in transmission by the carrier." 7 5
An adverse argument was posited by IBM who believed that AT&T in-
truded into the periphery of the office equipment marketplace. 76 IBM con-
tended that computers' functions do not become communications merely by
virtue of their location in a remote access device. IBM argued that the
Dataspeed was in fact a data processing device because it performs functions
previously performed by the central processor to which the teletypewriter
was connected. Therefore, IBM objected to AT&T's provision of a terminal
as part of its tariff.
lation. This enables the central processing computer to devote more attention to
other tasks and thereby increase its productivity.
(2) There is an increase in the efficiency of the use of communications facilities.
Rather than transmitting one character followed by a pause followed by another
character etc., one may transmit a block of data with a minimization of transmis-
sion time.
68. There are at least 220 terminals from 79 vendors available today which are comparable
to the Dataspeed. DATAPRO (April, 1977) at 70 D-010-2a.
69. In particular, a 2400 and 4800 bits per second Dataphone Digital Service (under Tariff
F.C.C. No. 267) and also voice grade private line service (under Tariff F.C.C. No. 260). Datas-
peed 40/4, supra note 6, at 21.
70. Actually the Computer Inquiry I rules merely state that data processing is to be unregu-
lated. The 1956 Consent Decree prevents AT&T from engaging in unregulated activities. There-
fore, AT&T cannot provide data processing. This led it to favor an expansive definition of com-
munication since this implies regulation.
71. Dataspeed 40/4, supra note 6, at 75.
72. Previously, a user could obtain the same type of service by use of a teletypewriter and a
papertape unit. The message could be punched on tape, the tape edited (albeit rather ineffi-
ciently), and once all of the errors were removed it could be transmitted.
73. Actually, the users manipulated the teletypewriter along with its paper tape unit to
achieve these functions.
74. See note 48 supra.
75. Dataspeed 40/4, supra note 6, at 27.
76. Anderson, IBM Versus Bell in Telecommunications, DATAMATION (May, 1977) at 91.
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The Chief of the Common Carrier Bureau ruled that the offering was a
data processing service in that it was intended for either on-site or remote
access interaction with a central computer. In so doing, he noted that the
device "falls into that class of equipment which is designed to be used and
marketed solely for the input, output, formatting, and conversion of
computer-based data and which is not generally intended for basic terminal-
to-terminal transmission." 77
If the rejection was based on the Dataspeed being "incapable of the tradi-
tional record communication functions of the predecessor Teletype de-
vices," 78 then the Chief was clearly mistaken. Such reasoning ignored the
options available to AT&T. It could easily attach a printer, autoanswering,
and autodialing units to the Dataspeed terminal thereby enabling it to as-
sume all of the functions of traditional record communications devices.
Rejection of' the Dataspeed 40/4 tariff on the ground that it incorporated
data processing fuinctions previously handled by the central computer, is also
questionable in light of the FCC's mandate to promote the efficient use of
communication facilities. 7 9 AT&T proposed to increase the efficiency of
utilization of' communications links by eliminating large gaps of inactivity.
The fact that another device, the central computer, can perform a function,
albeit less efficiently, is no reason to bar a carrier from improving the situa-
tion. Such capability would result in greater utilization of the telephone
network and could lower the costs to the public-a goal mandated to the
FCC. 80
The FCC overruled the decision of the Chief of the Common Carrier
Bureau. First, it found that Dataspeed 40/4 did not fill within the scope of
the maximum separation policy. In doing so, it reasoned "that AT&T is not
providing, and does not propose to offer, the data processing operations of
the central computer which render the Dataspeed 40/4 functional. '" 8 1
Second, the FCC decided that the Dataspeed 40/4 offering was communi-
cations. This decision was based, in part, on the previously mentioned ob-
servation that the service incorporated data processing capabilities which re-
sult in a more efficient method of' transmitting data over a communications
link. And such a result, reasoned the FCC, is a principle of' the Commis-
sion's "statutory mandate as long as there are no contervailing [sic] public
interest factors." 82
77. Dataspeed 40/4, supra note 6, at 25.
78. Id. at 27.
79. See note 1 supra.
80. id.
81. Dataspeed 40/4, supra note 6, at 30. Recall, "[t]he maximum separation policy was
directed to the provision and utilization of central host computers by communications common
carriers in the offering of their data processing servicies." Id. It did not address the distribution
of data processing among devices other than the central computer, a new development not in
widespread use at the time of Computer Inquiry I.
82. Dataspeed 40/4, supra note 6, at 30.
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Finally, the FCC took note of the ongoing Computer Inquiry and re-
stricted its holding to the factual situation presented by the Dataspeed 40/4
offering. Furthermore, in light of the inadequacy of its current rules as they
pertain to offerings such as the Dataspeed 40/4, the Commission indicated
its belief that it would be appropriate to enlarge the ongoing Computer In-
quiry to "include issues raised by a carrier's provision of peripheral devices
which might be considered data processing activities to determine whether
this results in the offering of communications or data processing service." 3
The FCC's decision can be criticized on several grounds. First, it leads an
observer to believe that all subsequent terminal devices similar to the Data-
speed would be regulated. Such a decision begs the main issue in that the
provision of the terminal must be decoupled from the provision of the com-
munications service. Every terminal device manufacturer should be able to
take advantage of a communications service like Dataspeed 40/4. Second, it
seems that the FCC took into account the special plight of AT&T arising
from the combination of the 1956 Consent Decree and the Commission's
decision not to regulate data processing. If the FCC had characterized the
terminal device and communications as distinct services, then AT&T could
offer the communications service only. It could not offer the terminal absent
modification of the 1956 Consent Decree. This situation is unfortunate since
the function of the device, not the identity of the offeror, should be the
principal issue.
SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF INQUIRY
The Supplemental Notice of' Inquiry and Enlargement of Proposed
Rulemaking was undertaken in reaction to the Dataspeed proceeding.
Primarily, it clarified some of the definitions set forth in the original Notice
of Inquiry 11.84 A new definition of data processing was offered with little
apparent difference from the one offered in the original Notice of Inquiry
II.85
83. Id. at 31.
84. Notice of Inquiry II, supra note 2.
85. Compare Notice of Inquiry II, supra note 2, at 107, with Supplemental Notice, supra
note 2, at 774. The only difference was the use of "information content" instead of "semantic
content" which has an effect of expanding the domain of data processing. The reason for the
difference is most likely the dispute in the Dataspeed 40/4 proceeding with respect to the
question of whether the intermediate processing of the message by the terminal was a change in
the semantic content. The term "information content" seems to indicate that data processing did
in fact occur since local editing (i.e., form preparation), in the case of the Dataspeed 40/4
service, did transform the information content of the input information whereas its semantic
content clearly did not change-it meant the same before and after the local processing in the
terminal. The distinction between "semantic content" and "information content" is subtle. In-
formation content can be viewed as simply the message that has been transmitted. Semantic
content refers to the meaning of the message. For example, suppose the message pertains to an
order to a wholesaler. In particular, a customer orders 10 widgets, however, he already has 5
widgets in stock. A system can be conceptualized which will translate the order of 10 widgets to
one for 5 widgets. Thus the semantic content of the message may not have changed; yet, its
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The examples of data processing were identical to those in the original
Notice of Inquiry 11.86 However, there was a minor change in the
categories of network control and routing, and of input/output processing.8 7
The category of network control and routing was refined to make it clear that
the terms error detection and correction applied only to errors of a transmis-
sion nature.88 The reason for this change was to avoid a conflict with a
definition of data processing that might lead to disagreement as to the type
of errors that can be detected and corrected.89  In the category of input/
output processing the terms "information sources and receptors" were used
instead of "computers and terminals." 90  This change was most probably
influenced by the failure of the term "terminal" to fully capture the activities
which transpire in a distributed network. It may very well be the case that
the network has no physically recognizable termina. 9 1
With respect to the various examples of processing activities which would
not constitute data processing, such as network control and routing and
input/output processing, the FCC was careful to state that these services
could be incorporated into a carrier's communications offering without need-
ing to comply with the maximum separation requirement. Furthermore, the
employment of such activities in the course of providing either communica-
tions or data processing services would not, by itself" change the nature of
the service provided.9 2
Deletion of the hybrid concept of Inquiry I rendered communications and
data processing mutually exclusive activities in the eyes of the FCC.
Nevertheless, the Commission in the Supplemental Notice of Inquiry did
recognize the possibility of a carrier offering a communications service with
some data processing when it left the door open for ad hoc determinations.
information content has clearly changed. Another example of a change in information content is
a grammatical correction-e.g., "I done gone to the store" becomes "I went to the store."
86. Supplemental Notice, supra note 2, at 774.
87. See note 62 supra.
88. Supplemental Notice, supra note 2, at 774-75. An example is line noise which results in
0 being transmitted instead of 1 or vice versa.
89. Consider a spelling correction program. If a document is being sent to a computer, then
automatic correction of such errors serves to prevent subsequent user interactions and thus
enables more people to make use of a transmission line. Note that a number of spelling correc-
tion programs are available today. However, they are not yet offered by a communications
common carrier. Instead, they exist at various computer centers as programs available to their
users. Under the FCC's proposed definitions, a spelling correction service would be considered
data processing.
90. Compare Supplemental Notice, supra note 2, at 774 with Notice of Inquiry II, supra
note 2, at 110.
91. In many network applications such as packet communications, there exist no terminals.
instead, computers are used as communications devices between the various nodes on the net-
work. For a thorough discussion of packet communications issues see Berman, supra note 1, at
193-201.
92. Supplemental Notice, supra note 2, at 775.
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In particular, it offered the following guideline as an aid to resolve conflicts:
"IT]he specific determination to be made becomes whether the processing
activity under consideration constitutes a data processing activity. To the
extent that the processing performed is data processing under our definition,
a carrier's offering [the data processing component] would be subject to our
maximum separation requirements." 93
This guideline seems to indicate that an offering such as the Dataspeed
40/4 should be separated into two components. The transmission part is
clearly communications. The classification of the terminal rests on whether
the functions performed by the terminal itself constitute "data processing"
services or are part of the communications package much as is the ordinary
telephone handset.
Perhaps the key to the dilemma is the FCC's conclusion that "[t]he nature
of the processing employed would determine whether communications pro-
cessing or data processing is being engaged in." 94  Closer examination of
the nature of the processing reveals that the terminal is serving as an input/
output device to another computer and thus it should be classified as a data
processing service. 95
RESPONSE ELICITED BY COMPUTER INQUIRY II
Because regulatory decisions of the FCC affect the economic survival of'
the entities, it is important to consider their reactions and recommenda-
tions with respect to potential regulation. In Inquiry II's solicitation of
responses, the Commission was primarily interested in whether the mar-
keting of customer-premises equipment ought to be considered a communi-
cations common carrier activity; and if so, what rules should be governing
such offerings. In particular, it invited comments with respect to the 1956
Consent Decree and its applicability to the oflering of customer-premises
equipment by AT&T. 96 The FCC was in search of a line of demarcation to
93. Id. at 777.
94. Id.
95. Such a decision might be considerably more difficult in the case of a touch tone tele-
phone with a considerable amount of memory. In this case, the telephone can be used on some
days primarily for data entry and on other days primarily for voice communications. Under such
circumstances, it would be preferable to err on the side of a communications classification if for
no better reason than that the voice communications application was there first. Furthermore,
such rulings are much harsher on AT&T than on other carriers since AT&T is barred by the
1956 Consent Decree from engaging in non-regulated activities. These definitions and interpre-
tations imply that the Commission erred in the Dataspeed 40/4 decision. However, it is most
likely that any new rules would only be prospective thereby resulting in "grandfathering" the
Dataspeed 40/4 as a communications service.
96. The Commission requested that the following issues be addressed:
(a) Whether the proposed definition of "data processing" correctly divides "com-
munications" and "data processing" when applied to a carrier's processing ac-
tivities, regardless of location within a service offering; and whether the pro-
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distinguish computer and communications services which would reduce ad
hoc determinations to a minimum. In order to place the responses to these
issues in their proper perspective, it is important initially to become familiar
with the parties which are most affected by FCC action.
The parties involved in the proceeding can be subdivided into four
categories. They are manufacturers of data processing and communications
devices, users of data processing and communications services, common car-
riers, and the Department of Justice. These parties, with the exception of
the Justice Department, are primarily interested in preserving access to the
marketplace. They abhor the maximum separation doctrine, at least in so far
as it is applicable to themselves. Similarly, the various manufacturers of data
processing and communications devices, and their corresponding industry
associations, 97 share a common desire to keep AT&T, and to a lesser extent,
the remaining common carriers out of the marketplace.
As has been indicated, the current trend in data processing applications is
to use communications less and rely more heavily on local processing, given
the decrease in the cost of computing in relationship to the cost of com-
munications.98  AT&T's realization of this trend prompted it to introduce
new "communications" services such as the Dataspeed 40/4. Therefore,
AT&T has embarked on a mission to demonstrate that its entrance into data
processing serves a public interest. It has claimed that "[s]uch participation
will often ensure that small users, whose needs otherwise might not be met,
will be served." 99 AT&T also cited customer comments as to the desirabil-
posed sec. 64.702 will be administratively enforceable and in the public in-
terests;
(b) Whether the proposed amendment of sec. 64.702 will afford flexibility in the
structuring of service offerings, and, at the same time, be conducive to innova-
tion in the communications and data processing fields;
(c) Whether the offering of customer-premises equipment which performs any in-
formation processing activity, other than basic media conversion, should be con-
sidered a communications common carrier activity; and the proper institutional
arrangements, terms, conditions, and regulations under which communications
common carriers should be permitted to make such offerings.
(d) Specific legislative proposals or recommendations directed at remedying any in-
adequacies of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, in dealing with the
confluence of data processing and communications.
Supplemental Notice Inquiry, supra note 2, at 778.
97. Examples of such manufacturers are Computer Communications Industry Assoc. (CCIA)
and Communications Business Equipment Manufacturing Assoc. (CBEMA).
98. The Department of Justice intimates that recent trends, such as distributed processing
are, in part, designed to circumvent the expense of regulation. Reply Comments of Department
of Justice, supra note 3, at 24.
99. Reply Comments of AT&T, supra note 3, at 2. This is an appeal to the purpose of the
Communications Act of 1934, which was, in part, to bring the benefits of modern communica-
tions to rural areas. Thus an attempt is made to draw an analogy between small users and rural
users.
This analogy, however, finds little support when one takes note of the proliferation of termi-
nals, "little guy" entrepreneurs, and tailor-made services in the data processing marketplace.
See note 68 supra. Furthermore, data processing, unlike communications, does not require
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ity of the presence of common carriers in the versatile communications mar-
ketplace. 100 This is understandable since many users like the short term
effects of a company with a strong financial reserve competing in a market.
However, the long term effects resulting from the elimination of competition
might not be as attractive. 10 1
IBM's primary concern is that the data processing industry ought not be
regulated. It too is aware of the declining cost of computing which implies a
decline in the growth rate of revenues from the hardware manufacturing
sector of its operations. 10 2 This caused it to view the area between office
equipment and transmission 103 as a future market. 10 4  Regulation would
impair its access to the market. Because of a recent antitrust action against
IBM, 10 5 it feared the FCC would view its entry into such a sector as an-
ticompetitive. Therefore, IBM favored a modification of' the 1956 Consent
Decree to enable AT&T to participate in such a marketplace as an unregu-
lated entity subject to strict accounting provisions which fall short of
maximum separation. 10 6  This is sound policy for IBM since an approval of
the modification would highlight the dangers of overly restricting the market
in which a corporation may participate.
The Department of Justice's interests are threefold-economic efficiency,
pending antitrnst lawsuits against IBM 107 and AT&T, 108 and the 1956 Con-
sent Decree. 10 9 In particular, it is concerned that a system of FCC regula-
tion which allocates segments of the terminal business to carriers and other
parts to data processing firms could thwart the relief' sought in its action
large investment capital for entry. As IBM pointed out in its reply, section 214(d) of the Com-
munications Act of 1934 is expressly limited to "lines." It was not intended to mean that carriers
are required "to create new, unprofitable services that perform more than the pure transmission
function and are priced to be affordable by all conceivable users." Reply Comments of IBM,
supra note 3, at 13.
100. "Users submitting comments also emphasize the need for participation by common car-
riers in providing versatile and sophisticated communication services." Reply Comments of
AT&T, supra note 3, at 2.
101. In 1970, Datran offered switched digital data serrvice. In 1974 AT&T responded with
Dataphone Digital Service. This service was priced 40% below the transmission costs of Dat-
ran's service and drained away its business thereby forcing it out of business. Reply Comments
of CCIA supra note 3, at 30-32.
102. The explosive rate of miniaturization of computer circuitry has resulted in a dramatic
reduction in prices which is reflected by the fact that the cost of a central processing unit is a
very small part of today's cost of a computer system. Peripheral equipment and, to a certain
extent, software make up an increasing share of the cost.
103. The office typewriter has been enhanced with the aid of computers and the addition of
communication capabalities.
104. See note 76 supra.
105. United States v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 60 F.R.D. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
106. Reply Comments of IBM, supra note 3, at 43. IBM was undoubtedly serving notice of
its own abhorrence of a maximum separation policy should it be compelled in the future to be a
party to a consent decree as a result of pending antitrust action against it.
107. See note 105 supra.
108. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 427 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976).
109. Reply Comments of Department of Justice, supra note 3, at 3.
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against AT&T; an action which was designed to open up the mar-
ketplace. 110 It is also leery of unleashing AT&T on the data processing in-
dustry before settlement of its action against IBM since it believes that the
industry is already confronting one monopolistic competitor. 11 ' Thus, it is
clear that these pending antitrust actions lead the Department of Justice to
take a very cautious attitude in the proceeding.
Responses to the Definitions Proposed
in the Supplemental Notice Inquiry
Having introduced the positions of the parties which are most affected by
FCC regulatory policy, it remains to explore the responses generated by the
Supplemental Notice of Inquiry. The responses of the participants to the
proposed definitions serve to reinforce one commentator's opinion that the
inquiry was an exercise in semantics. 1 12  IBM correctly pointed out that the
Commission should have pursued a path that would have led to distinguish-
ing monopoly areas from competitive areas rather than creating arbitrary dis-
tinctions between data processing and communications.1 3  The definitions
imply that data processing and communications are mutually exclusive. Un-
fortunately, the majority of the respondents proceeded under the illusion
that the Commission was wedded to these definitions and merely proposed
slight modifications to protect their _particular interests from unwanted regu-
lation or competition. 114  A better tactic may have consisted of efforts to
110. Id. at 8.
111. Id. at 47.
112. Eger, Bell's End Run, DATAMATION (May 1977) at 81.
113. Reply Comments of IBM, supra note 3, at 3.
114. Some examples include:
CCIA preferred a direct definition of "communication common carrier services"
rather than an indirect one with inexpert definitions of data processing. Reply
Comments of CCIA, supra note 3, at 25.
Western Union took exception to enlarging data processing to include "word pro-
cessing" since it viewed this as one of its traditional functions (e.g., formatting, use
of stored message texts and address lists, editing, correction, etc.). Essentially, it
did not want to be precluded from computerizing functions performed previously by
mechanical or electromechanical means since this improves efficiency and reduces
costs. Reply Comments of Western Union, supra note 3, at 3-4.
ADAPSO wished that the examples of services that constitute data processing, and
likewise for communications, given in the Supplemental Notice would be included
in the rules proper so that the proposed definition would explicitly limit future
disputes over the "legislative history" of the new rules. Reply Comments of
ADAPSO, supra note 3, at 14.
AT&T objected to the inclusion of examples of data processing and communication
services in the rules proper on the ground that such an action "would inhibit the
development of new and innovative services by establishing categories with regula-
tory significance that may have no relationship to the actual needs of users." Reply
Comments of AT&T, supra note 3, at 47.
IBM objected to (1) the inclusion of "formatting, editing, and buffering of informa-
tion" in the definition of "input/output processing"; and (2) the failure of the defini-
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educate the FCC as to the problems arising from rigid, mutually exclusive
definitions.
The majority of the respondents favored retention of the hybrid category 115
believing that its flexibility provided a source of continuity which enabled
future planning. 1 6 It was considered that such a category eliminated the
need for a company to artificially distort an offering of new services in order
to avoid encompassing elements of both data processing and communica-
tions. 1 7 AT&T differed with this consensus and advocated elimination of
the hybrid rule because it fails to account for processing which is conducted
at locations other than the central computer sites." 8
Perhaps the most debated aspect of the proposed definition of data proces-
sing was clause (b)--"where the output information constitutes a pro-
grammed response to input information." 119 AT&T and other carriers were
particularly apprehensive since its inclusion might someday be construed to
preclude them from using their vast directory assistance data base. 120
Hence, AT&T called for its exclusion from the proposed definition. 121
tion of "processing" to explicitly include "sorting or merging." This is consistent
with its interest of not having carrier competition to, and regulation of, services it
might wish to incorporate in its central processing units. Reply Comments of IBM,
supra note 3, at 36-37.
115. The Department of Justice took a curious position. On the one hand, it claimed to have
no objections to the proposed rules. It saw them as based on "marketplace perceptions" rather
than physical characteristics, and viewed them as a preferable approach to solving jurisdictional
problems in light of the rapidly changing technology. Yet, on the other hand, it recommended
that "[t]o the extent that there is some body of interpretive decisions surrounding these rules
[of Computer Inquiry I] and they have been reviewed by the courts, retention of the present
rules has at least the virtue of familiarity." In addition, it pointed out the benefits of a "gray"
area with its resultant commercial and regulatory flexibility. This is in contrast to the world of
"black and white" of the new rules which it predicted, by virtue of the size of the stakes, would
result in an exchange of a large number of ad hoc determinations in the former case for a small
number of massive proceedings in the latter case. Reply Comments of Department of Justice,
supra note 3, at 27, 59-60.
116. Reply Comments of Boeing Computer Services, supra note 3, at 5-6.
117. Reply Comments of Telenet, supra note 3, at 22-23.
118. Reply Comments of AT&T, supra note 3, at 40. This viewpoint was undoubtedly influ-
enced by AT&T's desire to ensure that any new definition recognize that common carrier serv-
ices include incidental data processing services.
119. 47 C.F.R.§ 64.702 (a) (1977). See also note 59 and accompanying text supra.
120. Although directory assistance is currently a manual operation, there is clearly a potential
for using this data in an information retrieval application (privacy considerations aside).
121. Reply Comments of AT&T, supra note 3, at 109-10. However, other entities such as
Chemical Bank saw no reason for such concern and cited changed or discontinued telephone
numbers as examples of communications in the context of information retrieval which could be
permitted under the categories of network control and routing, and input/output processing.
Reply Comments of Chemical Bank, supra note 3, at 20 n. 1. Such sentiments were echoed by
CBEMA which noted that a regulation is always read in terms of its legislative history. Reply
Comments of CBEMA, supra note 3, at 61. In this case, CBEMA pointed out, the intent of the
Commission "is to describe the unregulated data processing services as a means of outlining
areas where new services must be offered by unregulated entities." Id.
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Opinions as to the Recission or Retention
of the 1956 Consent Decree
The 1956 Consent Decree emerging out of United States v. Western Elec-
tric Co. prohibits AT&T and its subsidiaries from engaging in any business
other than providing common carrier communications services.1 2 2  In that
decision, common carrier services were broadly defined as "communications
services and facilities, other than message telegram services, the charges for
which are subject to public regulation under the Communications Act of
1934." 123 Clearly, the more expansive the definition of communications, the
fewer the restraints which will be imposed on AT&T by the Decree. There-
fore, AT&T advocated retention of this expansive definition of communica-
tions 124 and found no need fbr modification of the Consent Decree.
The Department of' Justice assumed that the court would not be per-
suaded to modify the Decree since such an action would imply a reversal.
Because the economic structure of AT&T remained the same and its domi-
nance in the market had not altered, the reasoning underlying the Consent
Decree remained valid. 125 Moreover, the Justice Department recognized
that many other organizations had invested substantial capital in reliance on
the restriction upon AT&T from diversif'ying into the sector. 126 Retention of
the Consent Decree also appeared necessary since the maximum separation
doctrine announced in Computer Inquiry I could not mitigate anticompeti-
tive practices. The Department noted that the GTE Service Corp. decision
placed severe constraints on the FCC's ability to regulate cross dealings of'
regulated carriers and their data processing subsidiaries. 127 In addition, the
Department of' Justice felt that a court of equity, in reviewing the matter,
would not focus solely on economic efficiency theories and overlook recent
conduct by AT&T 128 or the expected arguments from data processing com-
panies. All these factors culminated in a view that there was little possibility
of modification of' the Decree.1 29
IBM's supported modification of the Consent Decree would enable AT&T
to compete in the data processing sector. It recommended that the FCC
should seek modification through the Department of' Justice, the courts, or
122. United States v. Western Elec. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 68,246 & 71,136
(1956).
123. Id. at 71, 137.
124. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
125. Reply Comments of Department of Justice, supra note 3, at 50, quoting United States
v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932) (Justice Cardozo commenting on a modification).
126. Id. at 47.
127. A serious issue is the inequity in raising capital. Compare the solid financial footing of
AT&T, in the light of its monopoly status, with the possible shakiness of its competitors. The
FCC, unlike its counterparts the FPC and the ICC, lacks the authority to regulate the financial
marketplace activities of the common carriers. Id. at 51.
128. Id. at 55. See also notes 101 & 108 supra.
129. Id. at 54.
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in the Congress, 130 rather than distort its regulatory policies to circumvent
the Decree by allowing AT&T to provide non-monopoly services and
equipment. 13  Furthermore, it maintained that if the Department of Justice
indicated its approval of amendment of the Decree, then the court would
modify it.1 32 However, given the firm position of the Department of Justice
against any modification, IBM's position is analogous to one advocating the
exclusion of AT&T from the data processing marketplace.
Responses to the Issue of Whether to Regulate
Customer Premises Equipment
One of the key questions facing the FCC is whether the provision of
customer-premises equipment (CPE) ought to be characterized as a com-
munications common carrier activity thus subject to regulation. The ensuing
discussion focuses on the problems associated with its regulation and com-
mon carrier participation in this area. 133 Further, it provides an analysis of
the suggestions proposed by a number of the respondents. 134
A number of respondents believed that regulation of customer premises
equipment would be unnecessary 135 since existing competition among the
various sellers of such data processing services and equipment provides con-
tinuing assurance of their availability on a fair basis without regulation.
Moreover, regulation was viewed as inadequate since by the time the FCC
responds to anticompetitive actions, they would have already exacted their
toll. 136
A more fundamental objection to regulation was raised by the Seattle First
National Bank OD the basis of freedom to contract.1 37 As the Bank saw it,
the problem with tariffed regulated services was that everything was gov-
erned by the tariff which, as a matter of law, could not be varied by con-
tract. On the other hand, unregulated service and equipment offerings could
be tailored to fit a specific user's needs and requirements. Furthermore, it
cited the inability of' a regulated carrier, such as AT&T, to meet the
130. Reply Comments of IBM, supra note 3, at 34.
131. id. at 24.
132. Id. at 26.
133. The discussion only stresses the problems associated with regulation of the provision of
customer-premises equipment and responses to calls for regulation thereof. For a general argu-
ment in favor of regulation, see the discussion of "cream skimming" and related issues at note
10 supra.
134. Regulation is only addressed in the context of CPE and not resale-like issues.
135. Reply Comments of IBM, supra note 3, at 9. See generally Reply Comments of IBM,
(comments of Jones), supra note 3.
136. See HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95 CONG., 2d SESS., COMMENTS IN RE DATRAN BY A.G.W. BID-
DLE, PRESIDENT COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 16 (1977).
137. Reply Comments of Seattle First National Bank, supra note 3, at 6.
1978]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
competition expeditiously because any changes in service must be approved
by the FCC or the appropriate state regulatory commission.13 8
The Computer Business Equipment Manufacturing Association (CBEMA)
cautioned against the danger of allowing common carriers to oiler equipment
as well as carriage services. They feared that certain tariffs may establish
technical standards which would favor the carrier's equipment and thus be
anticompetitive. 139 The carrier would therefore enjoy an unfair advantage
over competitors who have to expend time and effort in order to tool up to
meet such specifications if' their equipment is to be compatible with the
tariff. Moreover, the policy of maximum separation would not protect non-
regulated competitors from this headstart by the communications carriers'
manufacturing affiliates who would inevitably be apprised of long-range cor-
porate planning by thecommunications carrier. Such an inevitable flow of in-
formation between affiliates would allow the equipment manufacturing af-
filiate to conform their equipment before non-affiliate competitors have in-
formation of changes. The GTE Service Corp. decision would exacerbate this
problem as it limits FCC authority to act outside the communications sector
and restrict such a flow of infbrmation to its non-communications affiliates.
When tariffhng a new service the FCC must consider its effect on existing
equipment and services as a precondition to its authorization of the new
service. 140 In addition, the proponent of the service often must dem-
onstrate that the service is not duplicative of an existing service. This
might be acceptable to an industry accustomed to regulation; however, the
data processing industry is accustomed to dramatic advances in technology
and is willing to assume the concomitant risk of rapid obsolescence. Regu-
lated entities, however, traditionally are prevented from abandoning their
existing equipment and services.' 4 '
IBM did not agree with AT&T's argument that regulation was necessary
because such services are "socially too important" to leave unregulated. 142 It
felt that regulation should be imposed only where there are no competing
sellers. 143 In the same vein, one may argue that just because common car-
riers have traditionally provided terminals for record communications (e.g.,
teletypewriters) under regulation, there is no reason to continue doing so for
more advanced computer terminals. 144
CBEMA cautioned that the mere fact that a regulated communications
common carrier could supply computer services by use of its existing plant
138. Id. at 7.
139. Reply Comments of CBEMA, supra note 3, at 78.
140. Reply Comments of IBM, supra note 3, at 26.
141. Id. at 27, citing KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 117-22 (1970).
142. Reply Comments of IBM, supra note 3, at 8, quoting Reply Comments of AT&T, supra
note 3, at 81.
143. Id. at 8-9.
144. See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977). This re-
cent opinion reversed the FCC's Execunet decision. Decision, MCI Telecommunications Corp.,
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should not be determinative of whether it should be allowed to participate in
the data processing industry.145  Conceivably, an unending list of additional
data processing services could be oflered by communications common car-
riers within their present plants. 146  Computer Inquiry I settled this prob-
lem, however, by refusing to allow Western Union to use its plant for
"back-up" computer services during the off-peak hours. 1 47
These arguments serve to illustrate that integration of computer services
in the telephone and related communication industries is not necessarily in
the public interest. In particular, it may stifle innovation. Due to the large
capital investment in communication plants, 14 a carrier may not wish to
innovate in certain segments of its services since such innovation may render
connecting segments technically obsolete. 149  In fact, close examination of
the mandate of the FCC 150 fails to reveal any evidence to compel a carrier
to provide every segment of a particular service. This view is recognized by
the existence of unregulated equipment vendors and the policies adopted by
the Commission for terminal registration. 1 5 1
60 F.C.C.2d 25, 57-58 (1976). Judge Wright cautioned the Commission that public interest
determinations cannot be based on the way things were done before.
[J]ust as it is not free to create competition for competition's sake, it is not free to
propagate monopoly for monopoly's sake. The ultimate test of industry structure in
the communications common carrier field must be the public interest, not the pri-
vate financial interests of those who have until now enjoyed the fruits of de facto
monopoly. (footnotes omitted).
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
145. Reply Comments of CBEMA, supra note 3, at 41.
146. E.g., GTE would like to see Automatic Reminder Wake-Up service included within the
definition of communications. This service has been traditionally provided by telephone answer-
ing services. However, just because new computer equipment for central office switches makes
this service easy to provide does not mean GTE must provide it. Reply Comments of GTE,
supra note 3, at 8-10 of Appendix 1.
147. The Commission was particularly concerned with the possibility of a breakdown of
equipment dedicated to public service and wished the excess capacity to be immediately avail-
able for that purpose without the conflicting claims of the other user. Final Decision, supra
note 15, at 271.
148. $94 billion according to AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH Co., ANNUAL REPORT 28
(1976).
149. See Appendix B to Reply Comments of CCIA, supra note 3, for an analysis of AT&T's
innovations and lack thereof.
150. Section 1 of the 1934 Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970) merely requires the
Commission to "make available so far as possible, to all people of the United States, a rapid,
efficient, nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate
facilities at reasonable charges."
151. See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 420
(1968). See also Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll
Telephone Service (MTS) and Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS), 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975),
aff'd sub nom., North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977). Sub-
sequent to these decisions AT&T's manufacturing affiliate, Western Electric, had to drastically
change its traditional ways of doing business. Until a few years ago its phone switch-gear plants
were producing electromechanical equipment whereas today 85% of their production is elec-
tronic. The New Telephone Industry, Bus. WEEK, February 13, 1978, at 68.
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Any attempt by the FCC to draw a line with respect to the regulation of
customer-premises equipment must pay close attention to the GTE Service
Corp. decision. Recall, it held that the FCC had no authority to regulate the
data processing industry even to the extent of protecting that industry from
encroachment by the communications industry. 152  Furthermore, the FCC
had previously stated that it declined to regulate the data processing indus-
try. 1 53 Therefore, while the Commission might have the authority to regu-
late a common carrier's entry into a non-communications area, insofar as it
might affect the provision of common carrier services, any other attempt to
regulate this field is beyond its mandate. 154
IBM proposed that all customer-premises equipment and services which
involve more than pure transmission be unregulated. 155  It cited Frontier
Broadcasting Co. v. Collier 156 which defines a common carrier to be one
who invites the public to use his carriage facilities, with appropriate com-
pensation, "for the transmission of' such intelligence as the subscriber may
choose to have transmitted." 157 Moreover, it emphasized the Commission's
determination that the choice of the specific intelligence to be transmitted is
the exclusive prerogative of the subscriber and not the carrier. 158
AT&T 15 9 did not agree with the "pure transmission" concept of IBM. 160 It
claimed that communications services involve more than mere "transporta-
tion." In particular, "communication in its most basic states requires the
acceptance of information in a form convenient to the user, modification for
efficient utilization of communication channels, and modification again to a
form useful to the recipient."161 If one is to accept AT&T's premise, then
the question becomes how much interaction should the user have with the
communications system. Is his role to be a "man in the loop?"162 If the
performance of these modifications is to be within the domain of AT&T,
152. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 734 (2d Cir. 1973).
153. Final Decision, supra note 15, at 268.
154. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 734 (2d Cir. 1973).
155. Reply Comments of IBM, supra note 3, at 40.
156. 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958).
157. Reply Comments of IBM, supra note 3, at 40, quoting 24 F.C.C. at 254.
158. Id. This is a rather naive interpretation of the definition which ignores modern advances
in communications and the carrier's statutory obligation to ensure efficiency (e.g., uses of com-
puters in multiplexing, switching, etc.) of carriage by transmitting messages as efficiently as
possible. Thus IBM would not allow a communications common carrier to offer, under regula-
tion, a service which edits or formats information so that a recipient such as the Central Process-
ing Unit (CPU) can more easily process or store it. In effect, it is stating that the message must
be delivered "in its original data format, code, or protocol." Reply Comments of IBM, supra
note 3, at 42.
159. Reply Comments of AT&T, supra note 3, at 13.
160. Neither did it adhere to a CBEMA proposal limiting regulation to "transparent" ex-
change and private line sources. See Reply Comments of IBM, supra note 3, at 40 and Reply
Comments of CBEMA, supra note 3, at 12-14.
161. Reply Comments of AT&T, supra note 3, at 13 n.2.




then how does one justify intervention by the user to perform modifications
on the message such as text editing? According to AT&T, its job is to per-
form the "modification for efficient utilization of communications channels."
Nonetheless, devices such as the Dataspeed are designed for an environ-
ment where the user plays a prominent role in the modification process.
This seems contrary to AT&T's conception of the tasks to be performed sole-
ly by it (as opposed to by the user) in the transmission process.
The Department of Justice cited traditional comments against entry of
regulated firms into unregulated fields. 163 These included an objection to
the siphoning away of resources in the process of diversification which could
be put to better use in upgrading existing services. It was also concerned
that unregulated firms would be confronting a competitor who is also the
supplier of a basic component of their service offerings. The arguments cited
essentially manifest a fear of "predatory pricing." Nevertheless, the Depart-
ment referred to economic studies which cast substantial "doubt on whether
'predatory price discrimination' is really much of a danger." 164 Thus, the
Department of Justice took a middle ground in concluding that it had no
objections to a system of regulation for carriers, absent regulation for non-
carriers.1 65 In fact, it stated that, in its view, a successful example of such a
policy was the Commission's technical registration and standards program
which was established to eliminate previous carrier restraints on the use of
independently supplied equipment.' 6
A number of respondents expressed reservations about the Commission's
actions or lack thereof. The American Bankers Association (ABA) was op-
posed to any experiment in which AT&T and other regulated communication
common carriers would be permitted to engage in unregulated com-
munications activities even though subject to a mandatory review. 1 67 The
ABA represents a group who are planning for a long-term investment of
capital in a new technology (Electronic Funds Transfer), and they want to
protect this interest. 168 Control Data Corporation (CDC) wanted an explicit
statement of regulatory forbearance from the Commission should the FCC
allow common carriers to enter the unregulated market. 16 9 It was recom-
mended that the statement should make it clear that the decision also
preempts state regulation in the area. In particular, CDC did not want to
163. Reply Comments of Department of Justice, supra note 3, at 44-45.
164. Id. at 45, quoting Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. Biv. 548,
587 (1969).
165. Id. at 58.
166. Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll Telephone
Service (MTS) and Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS), 57 F.C.C.2d 1216, 1229 (1976)
(Chairman Wiley, concurring).
167. Reply Comments of American Bankers Association, supra note 3, at 16.
168. Consider a decision which would result in changing the participants in the CPE mar-
ketplace.
169. Reply Comments of Control Data Corporation, supra note 3, at 4.
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see a recurrence of an attempt by a state regulatory commission to frustrate
the FCC's pro-competition policies. 170
Responses to the Maximum Separation Concept
Opinion on the maximum separation concept was divided. The carriers
objected to maximum separation, while the suppliers of data processing
equipment and services supported it. In general, non-monopoly common
carriers such as Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT General
Corporation) 171 and Telenet1 72 viewed maximum separation as an unjus-
tified policy with respect to their operations since they did not have
monopoly revenues with which to subsidize their non-monopoly services.
Western Union, 173 in light of' the losses it was incurring in providing tele-
graph service, felt that the maximum separation policy should only be
applied to major telephone carriers who have the potential to engage in
cross-subsidization.
CBEMA countered such a claim by recalling the Bunker Ramo experience
in order to demonstrate that prevention of abuse of network ownership is an
equally valid concern. 174 GTE regarded any application of' the maximum
separation policy as excluding it from the provision of such services by virtue
of its primarily rural and geographically dispersed service area which renders
separate entities economically unfeasible. 175  Other objections included an
increase in costs of data processing offerings due to the need to establish
separate companies, and an inconvenience to customers who need to deal
with separate suppliers for data processing and communications services.
This was fielt to be of particular hardship on small users. 176
Given the existence of the Consent Decree, AT&T had no choice but to
adopt a position that a maximum separation policy is unnecessary due to the
existence of other regulatory tools 177 designed to prevent the occurrence of'
cross-subsidization. 1 78 It felt that concerns about predatory pricing were
"grossly exaggerated" 179 and cited the comments of the Department of Jus-
tice which cast doubt as to whether the practice is really much of' a
danger.' s0  Moreover, it pointed out that cross-subsidization by a non-
common carrier may occur with equal or greater likelihood in a non-
170. North Carolina Util. Comm'n. v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976).
171. Reply Comments of COMSTAT General Corporation, supra note 3, at 6.
172. Reply Comments of Telenet, supra note 3, at 26.
173. Reply Comments of Western Union, supra note 3, at 2.
174. Reply Comments of CBEMA, supra note 3, at 84, citing Final Decision, supra note 15,
at 270-71. See also note 25 supra.
175. Reply Comments of GTE Serv. Corp., supra note 3, at 5 n.6.
176. Reply Comments of AT&T, supra note 3, at 62.
177. An example is the ratemaking process.
178. Reply Comments of AT&T, supra note 3, at 30-37.
179. id. at 30.
180. See note 167 & accompanying text supra.
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regulated environment. Specifically, a firm with dominance in one market
may overcharge in that market in order to subsidize lower prices in a more
competitive market 1 8 1 since such entities are not bound by regulatory con-
trols with respect to pricing nor do they have any overall earning con-
straints. 182
IBM did not see a need for a maximum separation policy. 183 Instead, it
advocated a system of cost accounting aimed at identifying and allocating
costs between regulated and unregulated areas. 184  Customers would be
provided with separate bills or billing notations for unregulated services.
Under this system, only the transmission portion of the Dataspeed 40/4 tariff
would remain tariffed, and the cost of the device itself would have to be
billed separately. The Computer Communications Industry Association
(CCIA) criticized IBM's proposal fbr failing to suggest "the type of cost ac-
counting practices and enforcement mechanisms the FCC should substitute
for a separations policy." 185
OUTCOME OF THE FCC INVESTIGATIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
FOR REGULATION
The notice of Inquiry failed to elicit a large number of legislative propos-
als. CCIA 186 and, to a limited extent, IBM, 187 recommended that the FCC
propose legislation to Congress requesting relief from the specific prohibi-
tions contained in the 1956 Consent Decree with respect to AT&T equip-
ment offerings which the FCC might find should not be subject to regula-
tion. However, as the Department of Justice pointed out, "the final author-
ity on the scope of the judgment is the judiciary."188
The Department of Justice made a comment regarding the FCC's lack of
authority to control the financial market activities of common carriers with
the exception of Communications Satellite Corporation 189 (COMSAT). Al-
though such authority is vested in other regulatory agencies such as the FPC
181. But, antitrust actions can resolve such matters.
182. Reply Comments of AT&T, supra note 3, at 31 n.1. This is a resurrection of
"creamskimming"-like arguments.
183. Reply Comments of IBM, supra note 3, at 43.
184. This is another instance where IBM is taking into account the possibility that a current
antitrust action against it might result in an unfavorable verdict. In such a case, IBM undoubt-
edly believes that it can compete on a modified separation policy rather than one of maximum
separation. Moreover, since IBM has a wide product line, it is better capable to withstand
competition with a subsidiary of AT&T without the benefit of a maximum separation policy. On
the other hand, the result of competition without maximum separation between a single-product
firm and AT&T might have a ruinous effect on the single-product firm. Also, one should not
overlook the fact that a large company such as IBM is not adverse to the elimination of some of
its competitors as could result from the absence of a maximum separation policy.
185. Reply Comments of CCIA, supra note 3, at 15.
186. Reply Comments of CCIA, supra note 3, at 53.
187. Reply Comments of IBM, supra note 3, at 5.
188. Reply Comments of Department of Justice, supra note 3, at 41.
189. Id. at 51, citing 47 U.S.C. 721(c) (8) (1970). See also note 160 supra.
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and the ICC 190 the Department of' Justice failed to take an outright position
on this issue although it did intimate that an amendment to the 1934 Com-
munications Act to include such authority was reasonable.' 9 1
Based on the responses, the following conclusions appear to be appro-
priate. The proposed definitions were useful in setting a discussion in mo-
tion; however, on the whole, they seem fairly irrelevant. The Commission
might as well retain the "hybrid" categories of the earlier Inquiry since they
have proved, by and large, to be workable. The key to the proceeding is
how to reconcile the 1956 Consent Decree barring AT&T from providing
unregulated services, with the natural desire to see an unregulated market
evolve in the domain of' customer-premises equipment. It is clear that the
common carriers, because of their role in technology, belong in this sector
provided that they subscribe to certain guidelines. This poses two problems.
First, the FCC must make a convincing argument to the District Court of'
New Jersey to modify the 1956 Consent Decree permitting AT&T to offer
data processing services incidental to communications on an unregulated
basis. Data communications is a rapidly growing area and AT&T clearly be-
longs in it; yet, not all of the data communications market should be regu-
lated. It is not feasible to regulate the many entities who wish to provide
data processing services incidental to communications. Moreover, the Com-
mission could reinforce a position to modify the Decree by reference to the
expansive definition of communications and the technological innovations
that have taken place since the promulgation of the Decree over 20 years
ago.
If the above approach is not successful, then the FCC could conceivably
resort to a system of regulation in which data processing is regulated when
offered by a communications common carrier and unregulated otherwise.
Despite its apparent attractiveness to some of the communications common
carriers, such a scheme does have drawbacks. In particular, it is difficult for
a regulated firm to quickly react to changing market conditions since such
actions generally require the approval of' the regulator.
The second problem is to prevent the use of' monopoly revenues from
cross-subsidizing non-monopoly activities. This can only be achieved via a
separation policy similar to that suggested by IBM for the communications
common carriers' non-monopoly services. The distinctions between data pro-
cessing and communications ought to be scrapped in favor of a definition
which leaves unregulated all activities which are not of' a natural monopoly
nature. Offerings which combine monopoly and a non-monopoly service
need not be offered by two separate entities; but, instead, their customers
must be provided with separate itemized bills for each service.
A final recommendation is for Congress to reexamine the Communications
Act of' 1934 to take into account recent developments in communications and
190. Id. See also note 160 supra.
191. Id. at 51-52.
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related technology. This would be best achieved by updating the current Act
to remove its dependence upon outdated concepts borrowed from its pre-
decessor, the Interstate Commerce Act. A revised Act which takes account
of today's marketplace realities is necessary to free the Commission to ren-
der decisions consistent with twenty-first century coiumun ications realities.

